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D. Bruce Oliver #5120 
Attorney for Petitioner and Appellant 
180 South 300 West, Suite 210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1490 
Telephone: (801) 328-8888 
Fax: (801) 595-0300 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MICHAEL WHITEMAN, ) BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Petitioner and Appellant, ) 
vs. ) 
) Court of Appeals No. 200400407-CA 
CLINT FRIEL,WARDEN and UTAH ) 
STATE PRISON BOARD OF PARDONS,) Docket No. 040900113 
Respondents and Appellees. ) Priority No. 2 
This is an appeal of the trial court's failure to grant a Writ of 
Extraordinary Relief concerning a Board of Pardon's imposition of a sentence at an 
original parole hearing. Petitioner asks this Court, de novo, to end the illegal activity 
of the Board of Pardons 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) 
(1953, as amended) (2)(e) (appeals transferred from the Utah Supreme Court). Mr. 
Whiteman appeals the final order and judgment of the Honorable L.A. Dever, Third 
Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County involving a review of Board of 
Pardons procedures concerning it sentencing duties. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Whether the ruling on Labrum v. Utah State Bd. Of Pardons, 870 P.2d 
902, 910 (Utah 1993) violates the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution pursuant 
to Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 88 S. Ct. 254, 19 L. Ed. 2d 336 (1967). 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The appropriate standard of review is for correctness. 
When reviewing an appeal from a dismissal of a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus, we accord no deference to the conclusions of law that underlie the 
dismissal. There are reviewed for correctness. However, while "we must 
review the fairness of the process by which the Board undertakes its sentencing 
function, . . . we do not sit as a panel of review on the result." 
Neel v. Holden, 886 P.2d 1097, 1103-1104 (Utah 1994) (internal citations omitted). 
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
[Included herewith in Addendum A.] 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case; 
This case arises from an appeal of a dismissal of a Petition For Writ Of 
Extraordinary Relief. (R. at 143-149) (Addendum B). The order was entered on May 
2 
24, 2004. A notice of appeal was entered on May 17, 2004 following the court's 
minute entry of April 23, 2004. 
II. Course of the Proceedings: 
This matter commenced on January 6, 2004 when Mr. Whiteman filed a 
Petition For Writ of Extraordinary Relief challenging the board of pardon's decision 
regarding errors brought to its attention by Mr. Whiteman, who was not represented by 
counsel at the original parole hearing nor at the special attention hearing following. (R 
at 1-29). On March 17, 2004, Friel opposed the petition by a motion to dismiss 
claiming that the Board exercised a discretionary function and that any other outcome 
regardless of errors is only tenuous. (R. at 70-120). 
III. Disposition in Trial Court: 
No trial was conducted, nor was an evidentiary permitted even though 
requested. (R. at 1-8). This matter was disposed of by notice to submit for decision 
without a hearing. (R. at 130-132). Mr. Whiteman did not challenge the findings of 
the court. 
IV. Statement of Facts: 
A jury convicted Petitioner of murder, a first degree felony. On November 
22, 1993, he was sentenced to a maximum mandatory term of five-years-to-life. On 
3 
November 12, 1996, the Board held an original hearing which resulted in a rehearing set 
for April 2003. On April 5, 1999, Petitioner's sentence was amended, showing a change 
from a "maximum mandatory term of five years and which may be for life" to a "not less 
than five years and which may be for life." In preparation for the April 5, 1999 hearing, a 
new Presentence Investigation Report was prepared. Petitioner requested a 
redetermination hearing. The Board conducted a Special Attention Review. After 
considering the information Petitioner provided, the Board determined not to change the 
previously scheduled April 2003 rehearing. Petitioner was informed that in assessing the 
guidelines/matrix, the Board "considers sentences imposed on convictions in other states, 
not whether the other state calls the offense a misdemeanor or felony. This is based on 
the fact that felonies and misdemeanors differ from state to state. An offense Utah might 
classify as a felony, California may classify as a misdemeanor. So, if the sentence 
imposed by California corresponds to a Utah felony sentence, the offense is counted as a 
felony on the matrix. Your matrix/guidelines have been configured with the new 
presentence investigation report, but no change was made in the final guideline time." On 
April 10, 2003, the Board conducted a rehearing and decided to parole Petitioner on April 
6, 2004. The Board also ordered two special conditions of parole: (1) cooperate with 
transitional services which may include a Community Correctional Center as directed by 
Adult Probation and Parole; (2) successfully complete mental health therapy to address 
substance abuse and cognitive restructuring issues. (R. at 144-145). 
4 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
In this matter, Mr. Whiteman was deprived of counsel at the original 
hearing of the Board of Pardons. Had counsel been afforded, at that time consistent 
with Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 88 S. Ct. 254, 19 L. Ed. 2d 336 (1967), no error 
would have resulted. The necessity for the aid of counsel in marshaling the facts, 
introducing evidence of mitigating circumstances and in general aiding and assisting the 
defendant to present his case as to sentence is appropriate. Id. 
At the time of Mr. Whiteman's original hearing, noone aided Mr. 
Whiteman to correctly present mitigating evidence concerning the sentence 
enhancement stemming from his California misdemeanor offenses. 
ARGUMENT 
MR, WHITEMAN WAS NOT AFFORDED COUNSEL AT THE 
ORIGINAL HEARING BEFORE THE BOARD OF PARDONS, 
IN VIOLATION OF MEMPA v. RHAY. 
In this matter, Mr. Whiteman presented his challenge of Board of Pardons 
practice of enhancing out-of-state misdemeanors to felony status for the purpose of 
imposing a sentence. (R. at 2). The only defense to that claim raised by Friel is that 
the practice is a discretionary function. (R. at 74-75). The practice is apparently 
unchecked due to the absence of defense counsel when consideration is being weighed. 
5 
Since 1913, Utah has employed an indeterminate sentencing system under which trial 
courts do not sentence offenders to a determinate term but impose a statutorily 
prescribed range of years. Act of March 24, 1913, ch. 100. 1913 Utah Laws 192; 
Labrum v. Utah St. Board of Pardons, 870 P.2d 902 (Utah 1993). Under Utah's 
current system, "the board of pardons determines the actual number of years a 
defendant is to serve." Labrum, 870 P.2d at 907. "For all intents and purposes, 
adoption of this indeterminate sentencing system transformed the Board from an agency 
having the ability to shorten a prisoner's judge-determined sentence into an agency 
with power analogous to that of a court to actually impose a sentence." Neel v. 
Holden, 886 P.2d 1097 (Utah 1994). 
Due to the fact that the Board has taken on a judicial function, it is 
undisputed that a Board's decision of whether to grant parole does implicate the 
offender's liberty interest because at the time an offender first comes before the Board, 
no term of incarceration has been fixed. Neel, at 1101. Because of the reasoning 
offered in Neel that a liberty interest is at risk before the Board on an original hearing, 
the practices of the Board must include the right of an offender to have counsel 
consistent with the reasoning by the U.S. Supreme Court in Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 
128, 88 S. Ct. 254, 19 L. Ed. 2d 336 (1967). 
In Mempa, the Court extended the right of counsel language to include the 
right to sentencing hearings. Mempa, a board of prison terms and paroles case itself, 
6 
challenged to the State of Washington's practice of considering sentencing entered into 
without counsel after probation had been revoked. After Mr. Mempa was convicted, 
he filed a petition for habeas corpus, which the State Supreme Court denied. 
At issue in that case was that a hearing, a probation officer presented 
hearsay evidence to the effect that Mr. Mempa had committed the acts alleged in 14 
separate counts of forgery and 14 separate counts of grand larceny that had been 
charged against petitioner previously at the time of his arrest. The court thereupon 
revoked probation and imposed the maximum sentence of 15 years-apparently a fixed 
determined sentence. 
In this matter, it is clear that Petitioner and others similarly situated would 
benefit substantially from having counsel represent them in the Board's original 
hearing. In example, the Board's records show Mr. Whiteman was not credited any 
mitigating damages. (R. at 85). Certainly, it is indisputable that prior misdemeanor 
convictions in California rather than felony status offenses in Utah is a clear mitigating 
factor that should have been considered and likely would have if counsel was afforded 
before the Board. Also, Mr. Whiteman's alleged felony status offenses in California, 
there is no evidence in the record that they were truly felony status in Utah nor is there 
record evidence that like in Mempa, if the alleged conduct was the acceptance of a plea, 
whether counsel was afforded at that time, or whether the conviction was the result of a 
revocation. (R. at 95-100). 
7 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Whiteman has been unjustly treated in this matter. This trial court 
should have granted Mr. Whiteman is requested relief, including an evidentiary 
hearing. Clearly, the Utah Board of Pardon's abused its discretion by assuming facts 
not in evidence. It was an abuse of discretion to assume the facts relevant to the 
California misdemeanors were in deed felony status offenses. Meanwhile, as argued 
hereinabove, Mr. Whiteman has raised a substantial issue on appeal that warrants a 
reversal by this Court and direction for the future. Counsel should be permitted to 
appear, provided, or otherwise afforded at Board original hearings because a liberty 
interest is at issue. 
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS NOTICE, 
Notice is hereby given that this appeal is to exhaust his state remedies, 
before presenting the matter to U.S. District Court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 25th day of October, 2004. 
D. BRUCE OLIVER 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, D. Bruce Oliver, hereby certify that on this 25th day of October, 
2004,1 served a copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT upon the counsel for 
the Appellee in this matter, by mailing it to the State of Utah by first class mail with 
sufficient postage prepaid to the following address: 
Annina M. Mitchell 
Office of the Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
A? 
D. BRUCE OLIVER 
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ADDENDUM A 
(Constitutional Provisions, Statutes) 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION Amend. VI 
53 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 249, Proof of 
Defense of Entrapment by Estoppel. 
41 Am. Jur. Trials 349, Habeas Corpus: Pre-
trial Rulings, §§ 16-24 (Double jeopardy) 
Amendment VI. Jury trial for crimes and procedural rights 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime 
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascer-
tained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence. 
Cross References 
Right to jury trial, criminal cases, see U S C A Const Art III, § 2 
Library References 
Criminal Law <&=>106 to 114, 577 1 to 
577 16(11), 641, 662 
Jury <&>9 to 37 
Witnesses @»2 
Westlaw Topic Nos 110, 230, 410 
C J S Criminal Law §§ 177 to 186, 277, 578 
to 608, 610 to 621, 1115, 1120 
C J S Declaratory Judgments § 155 
C J S Federal Civil Procedure §§ 943 to 952, 
954 
C J S Juries §§ 6 to 279, 284, 286, 292, 299, 
302 to 303, 306, 310, 354 to 356, 367, 396, 
409, 443 to 447, 450 to 456, 459 to 461 
C J S Witnesses § 6 
Research References 
ALR Library 
Accused's right, under 28 U S C A sec 1654 
and similar predecessor statutes, to repre-
sent himself in federal criminal proceeding, 
27 A L R Fed 485 
Accused's right to represent himself in state 
criminal proceeding—modern state cases, 
98 A L R 3 d 13 
Adequacy of defense counsel's representation 
of criminal client—Issues of incompetency, 
69 A L R 5th 1 
Adequacy of defense counsel's representation 
of criminal client—Pretrial conduct or con-
duct at unspecified time regarding issues of 
insanity, 72 A L R 5th 109 
Adequacy of defense counsel's representation 
of criminal client regarding appellate and 
postconviction remedies, 15 A L R 4th 582 
Adequacy of defense counsel's representation 
of criminal client regarding entrapment de-
fense, 8 A L R 4 t h 1160 
Adequacy of defense counsel's representation 
of criminal client regarding guilty pleas, 10 
A L R 4th 8 
Adequacy of defense counsel's representation 
of criminal client regarding hypnosis and 
truth tests, 9 A L R 4th 354 
Adequacy of defense counsel's representation 
of cnminal client regarding plea bargain-
ing, 8 A L R 4th 660 
Adequacy of defense counsel's representation 
of criminal client regarding post-plea reme-
dies, 1 3 A L R 4 t h 5 3 3 
Adequacy of defense counsel's representation 
of criminal client regarding prior convic-
tions, 14 A L R 4 t h 2 2 7 
Adequacy of defense counsel's representation 
of criminal client regarding right to and 
incidents of jury trial, 3 A L R 4th 601 
Adequacy of defense counsel's representation 
of criminal client regarding search and sei-
zure issues, 12 A L R 4th 318 
Appealability of federal court order denying 
motion for appointment of counsel for indi-
gent party, 67 A L R Fed 925 
Appointment of counsel, in civil rights action, 
under forma pauperis provisions (28 
U S C A sec 1915(d)), 69 A L R Fed 666 
Circumstances giving rise to prejudicial con-
flict of interests between criminal defendant 
and defense counsel—federal cases, 53 
A L R Fed 140 
Closed-circuit television witness examination, 
61 A L R 4 t h 1155 
Comment Note —Constitutionally protected 
right of indigent accused to appointment of 
counsel in state court prosecution, 93 
A L R 2 d 7 4 7 
Condition interfering with accused's view of 
witness as violation of right of confronta-
tion, 1 9 A L R 4 t h 1286 
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PECLARATION OF RIGHTS Art. 1, § 12 
1953,78-12-25.5, Const. Art 1, § 11. Klatt v. 
Thomas, 1990, 788 P.2d 510 Appeal And Error 
*» 1177(1) 
Sec . 12 . [Rights of accused persons] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to 
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged 
to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance 
shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance 
money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be 
compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to 
testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any 
person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the 
function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause 
exists unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall 
preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule m 
whole or in part at any preliminary examination to determine probable cause 
or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if 
appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule. 
Laws 1994, S J.R 6, § 1, adopted at election Nov 8, 1994, eff. Jan. 1, 1995. 
Cross References 
Rights of defendant, criminal procedure, see § 77-1-6 
Law Review and Journal Commentaries 
Confrontation Rights and Preliminary Hear- KUTV v Wilkinson Another Episode in the 
ings, Allred, 1986 Utah L Rev 75 (1986) Fair Trial/Free Press Saga, Hagen, 1985 Utah L 
Death Qualification and the Right to an Im- R e v 739 (1985) 
partial Jury Under the State Constitution Capi- Restraints on Defense Publicity in Criminal 
tal Jury Selection in Utah after State v Young J u r T C a s e s > S w i f t 1 9 8 4 U t a h L R e v 4 5 < 1 9 8 4 ) 
Knapp, 1995 Utah L Rev 625(1995) State v Herrera The Utah Supreme Court 
Determining Whether Miranda Warnings are * u [ e s m £ a ™ ; 0 ^ h ' " C f ^ f 5 ^ 1 / ? ^ ! ? 
Necessary Utah's Definition of Custody 1997 D e c f e n s e S t a t u t e ' 2 2 J^^P L 2 2 1 (J996\ 
Utah L Rev 137 (1997) State v 1 nomas and the McDonougn l e s t A 
T^  I T - > T rx,, Safety Net Proposal to Cure the Square Peg-
EHvmmg the Framers Intentions The Immu-
 R o u n d H o k D l l e m m a | J o n e r 1 9 9 3 B Y U L 
nity Standard tor Criminal Proceedings Under j ^ e v 1347 (1993) 
1 ^ ^ / o C n ° / ! J f t U t l ° n ' B ° W e r S ' 2 0 0 ° U m h L T o w a r d a Framework for Assessing When a 
Kev l i b (2000) Defendant is Capable of Knowingly and Intelli-
Hansen v Owens-Expansion of the Privilege
 g e n u y Waiving the Right to Counsel 1994 Utah 
Against Self-incrimination to Unknown Limits, L Rev 325 (1994) 
Young, 1981 Utah L Rev 447 (1981)
 U t a n Supreme Court and the Utah State Con-
Judicial Jabberwocky or Uniform Constitu- stitution, Marsden, 1986 Utah L Rev 319 
tional Protection Strickland v Washington and (1986) 
National Standards for Ineffective Assistance of Victims of Child Sexual Abuse in the Court-
Counsel Claims, O'Brien, 1985 Utah L Rev 723 room New Utah Rules and Their Implications, 
(1985) Michie 15 J Contemp L 81(1989) 
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CHAPTER 27 
PARDONS AND PAROLES 
Section 
77-27-1. Definitions. 
77-27-2. Board of Pardons and Parole—Creation—Compensation—Functions. 
77-27-3. Repealed. 
77-27-4. Chairperson and vice chairperson. 
77-27-5. Board of Pardons and Parole authority. 
77-27-5.3. Meritless and bad faith litigation. 
77-27-5.5. Review procedure—Commutation. 
77-27-6. Payment of restitution. 
77-27-7. Parole or hearing dates—Interview—Hearings—Report of alienists—Men-
tal competency. 
77-27-8. Record of hearing. 
77-27-9. Parole proceedings. 
77-27-9.5. Victim may attend hearings. 
77-27-9.7. Victim right to notification of release—Notice by board. 
77-27-10. Conditions of parole—Rulemaking—Intensive early release parole pro-
gram. 
77-27-10.5. Special condition of parole—Penalty. 
77-27-11. Revocation of parole. 
77-27-12. Parole discharge, sentence termination. 
77-27-13. Board of Pardons and Parole—Duties of the judiciary, the Department of 
Corrections, and law enforcement—Removal of material from files. 
77_27-14. Repealed. 
77-27-15. Repealed. 
77_27-16, 77-27-17. Repealed. 
77-27-18 to 77-27-21. Repealed. 
77-27-21.5. Sex offender registration—Information system—Law enforcement and 
courts to report—Registration—Penalty—Effect of expungement. 
77-27-22, 77-27-23. Repealed. 
77-27-24. Out-of-state supervision of probationers and parolees—Compacts. 
77-27-25. Amendments to interstate compact—Transfer of prisoners—Costs—Sup-
plementary agreements. 
77-27-26. Deputization of agents to effect return of parole and probation violators. 
77-27-27. Retaking or reincarceration for parole or probation violations—Hearing 
and notice to sending state—Detention of parolee or probationer. 
77-27-28. Hearing officer. 
77-27-29. Rights of parolee or probationer—Record of proceedings. 
77-27-30. Violation by parolee or probationer supervised in another state—Hearing 
in other state—Procedure upon receipt of record from other state. 
77-27-31. Short title. 
§ 7 7 - 2 7 - 1 . Definitions 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Board" means the Board of Pardons and Parole. 
(2) "Commission" means the Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice. 
(3) "Commutation" is the change from a greater to a lesser punishment after 
conviction. 
(4) "Department" means the Department of Corrections. 
450 
PARDONS & PAROLES § 77-27-1 
Note 1 
(5) ' 'Expiration' ; occurs when the maximum sentence has run. 
(6) "Family" means persons related to the victim as a spouse, child, sibling, 
parent, or grandparent, or the victim's legal guardian. 
(7) "Panel" means members of the board assigned by the chairperson to a 
particular case. 
(8) "Pardon" is an act of grace by an appropriate authority exempting a 
person from punishment for a crime. 
(9) "Parole" is a release from imprisonment on prescribed conditions which, 
if satisfactorily performed by the parolee, enables the parolee to obtain a 
termination of his sentence. 
(10) "Probation" is an act of grace by the court suspending the imposition or 
execution of a convicted offender's sentence upon prescribed conditions. 
(11) "Reprieve or respite" is the temporary suspension of the execution of 
the sentence. 
(12) "Termination" is the act of an appropriate authority discharging from 
parole or concluding the sentence of imprisonment prior to the expiration of 
the sentence. 
(13) "Victim" means: 
(a) a person against whom the defendant committed a felony or class A 
misdemeanor offense, and regarding which offense a hearing is held under 
this chapter; or 
(b) the victim's family, if the victim is deceased as a result of the offense for 
which a hearing is held under this chapter. 
Laws 1980, c 15, § 2; Laws 1985, c. 198, § 6, Laws 1988 , c. 172, § 1; L a w s 1990, c. 
195, § 1; L a w s 1994, c. 13, § 3 1 ; Laws 1996, c 100, § 3, eff. April 29 , 1996. 
Cross References 
Pardon and parole board, governor's powers, see Const Art 7, § 12 
Paroled persons, termination or discharge from sentence, see § 76-3-202 
Law Review and Journal Commentar ies 
May, Victims' Rights and the Parole Hearing, 
15 J Contemp L 1\ (1989) 
Notes of Decis ions 
In general 1 67-0-8 McCoy v H a m s , 1945, 108 Utah 407, 
160 P 2d 721 Pardon And Parole @=» 41, Par-
don And Parole <©=> 24 
• In general ^ parolee is still in custodia legis and under 
A "parole" is in the nature of a grant of control of the state board, though outside pnson 
partial liberty or a lessening of restrictions to a wall, and until the sentence is terminated the 
convicted prisoner, and the granting of a parole judgment committing him to custody of pnson 
does not change the status of the prisoner but authorities is still in effect Utah Code 1943, 
merely allows him greater freedom of move- §§ 67-0-7 ,67-0-8 McCoy v Harris, 1945, 108 
ftient while serving sentence, and he is still Utah 407, 160 P 2d 721 Pardon And Parole ®=> 
legally in custody Utah Code 1943, §§ 67-0-7, 24 
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§ 77-27-2 CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
§ 77—27-2 . Board of Pardons and Parole—Creation—Compensation-
Functions 
(1) There is created the Board of Pardons and Parole. The board shall 
consist of five full-time members and five pro tempore members to be appoint-
ed by the governor with the consent of the Senate as provided in this section. 
The members of the board shall be resident citizens of the state. The governor 
shall establish salaries for the members of the board within the salary range 
fixed by the Legislature in Title 67, Chapter 22, State Officer Compensation. 
(2)(a)(i) The full-time board members shall serve terms of five years. The 
terms of the full-time members shall be staggered so one board member is 
appointed for a term of five years on March 1 of each year. 
(ii) The pro tempore members shall serve terms of five years. The five 
pro tempore members added by Subsection (1) shall be appointed to terms 
that both commence on May 1, 1996, and respectively end on February 28, 
1999, and February 29, 2000. These terms are reduced by two and one 
years respectively so that the appointment of one pro tempore member 
expires every year beginning in 1996. Terms previously set to expire will 
now expire the last day of February of their respective years. 
(b) All vacancies occurring on the board for any cause shall be filled by the 
governor with the consent of the Senate pursuant to this section for the 
unexpired term of the vacating member. 
(c) The governor may at any time remove any member of the board for 
inefficiency, neglect of duty, malfeasance or malfeasance in office, or for 
cause upon a hearing. 
(d) A member of the board may not hold any other office in the govern-
ment of the United States, this state or any other state, or of any county 
government or municipal corporation within a state. A member may not 
engage in any occupation or business inconsistent with his duties. 
(e) A majority of the board constitutes a quorum for the transaction of 
business, including the holding of hearings at any time or any place within or 
without the state, or for the purpose of exercising any duty or authority of the 
board. Action taken by a majority of the board regarding whether parole, 
pardon, commutation, termination of sentence, or remission of fines or 
forfeitures may be granted or restitution ordered in individual cases is 
deemed the action of the board. A majority vote of the five full-time 
members of the board is required for adoption of rules or policies of general 
applicability as provided by statute. However, a vacancy on the board does 
not impair the right of the remaining board members to exercise any duty or 
authority of the board as long as a majority of the board remains. 
(f) Any investigation, inquiry, or hearing that the board has authority to 
undertake or hold may be conducted by any board member or an examiner 
appointed by the board. When any of these actions are approved and 
confirmed by the board and filed in its office, they are considered to be the 
action of the board and have the same effect as if originally made by the 
board. 
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(g) When a full-time board member is absent or in other extraordinary 
circumstances the chair may, as dictated by public interest and efficient 
administration of the board, assign a pro tempore member to act in the place 
of a full-time member. Pro tempore members shall receive a per diem rate 
of compensation as established by the Division of Finance and all actual and 
necessary expenses incurred in attending to official business. 
(h) The chair may request staff and administrative support as necessary 
from the Department of Corrections. 
(3)(a) Except as provided in Subsection (3)(c), the Commission on Criminal 
and Juvenile Justice shall: 
(i) recommend five applicants to the governor for appointment to the 
Board of Pardons and Parole; and 
(ii) consider applicants' knowledge of the criminal justice system, state 
and federal criminal law, judicial procedure, corrections policies and 
procedures, and behavioral sciences. 
(b) The procedures and requirements of Subsection (3)(a) do not apply if 
the governor appoints a sitting board member to a new term of office. 
(4)(a) The board shall appoint an individual to serve as its mental health 
adviser and may appoint other staff necessary to aid it in fulfilling its responsi-
bilities under Title 77, Chapter 16a, Commitment and Treatment of Mentally 111 
Persons. The adviser shall prepare reports and recommendations to the board 
on all persons adjudicated as guilty and mentally ill, in accordance with Title 
77, Chapter 16a. 
(b) The mental health adviser shall possess the qualifications necessary to 
carry out the duties imposed by the board and may not be employed by the 
Department of Corrections or the Utah State Hospital. 
(i) The Board of Pardons and Parole may review outside employment by 
the mental health advisor. 
(ii) The Board of Pardons and Parole shall develop rules governing 
employment with entities other than the board by the mental health advisor 
for the purpose of prohibiting a conflict of interest. 
(c) The mental health adviser shall: 
(i) act as liaison for the board with the Department of Human Services 
and local mental health authorities; 
(ii) educate the members of the board regarding the needs and special 
circumstances of mentally ill persons in the criminal justice system; 
(iii) in cooperation with the Department of Corrections, monitor the 
status of persons in the prison who have been found guilty and mentally ill; 
(iv) monitor the progress of other persons under the board's jurisdiction 
who are mentally ill; 
(v) conduct hearings as necessary in the preparation of reports and 
recommendations; and 
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(vi) perform other duties as assigned by the board. 
Laws 1985, c. 198, § 7; Laws 1986, c. 22, § 1; Laws 1988, c. 122, § 28; Laws 1990, c. 
195, § 2; Laws 1991, c. 114, § 26; Laws 1992, c. 171, § 16; Laws 1994, c. 13, § 32; 
Laws 1994, c. 223, § 17; Laws 1996, c. 117, § 1, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 1997, c 308, 
§ 15, eff. July 1, 1997; Laws 1998, c. 13, § 91, eff. May 4, 1998; Laws 1998, c. 22, § 1, 
eff. May 4, 1998, Laws 2002, c. 176, § 80, eff. May 6, 2002. 
Cross References 
Corrections department, see § 64-13-1 et seq 
Pardon and parole board, governor's powers, see Const Art 7, § 12 
Administrative Code References 
Pardons and parole, competency of offenders, see Utah Admin Code 671-206 
Library References 
Pardon and Parole <3=»55 1 
Westlaw Key Number Search 284k55 1 
Notes of Decis ions 
In general 1 Turner, 1968, 20 Utah 2d 350, 437 P 2d 891 
Privilege or immunity 2 Pardon And Parole <3=» 55 1 
2. Privilege or immunity 
1. In general Utah Board of Pardons and Parole officials 
T ^ m o r k J x
 A r> A A_* T c 11 were immune from damages liability to parolee The 1980 amendment to Const Art 7, $ 12, , ,
 vU ^ r * u i * i 
, , , r ™ J r -n J based on their entitlement to absolute or quali-
which narrowed power or Board or Pardons r J _ _ . i » R mon * n 
. T i i i ned immunity, in parolees 9 1983 action alleg-does not require that the parole system be urn- ^
 h e w a s d e m e d rtumty t o } 
^™ .
 U
 C A 1953, 76-5-403 1 77-27-2
 k b o a r d , s d e c i $ l o n s > " ^ h e ^ s ^ 
I i s ?» te T ^ ? ' 8 ' a c c e s s t o Parole board's standards and criteria, 
Pardon And Parole <S=> 41
 a n d t h a t p a r o l e b o a r d f a i l e d t Q c r e d l t h l s s e n . 
The quoted phrase in constitutional provision tence 42 U S C A § 1983 Malek v Haun, 
that "until otherwise provided by law" the gov- 1994, 26 F 3d 1013 Civil Rights &=> 1376(7), 
ernor, justices of supreme court and attorney Pardon And Parole <&* 56 
general shall constitute board of pardons does Claim by prisoner, under civil rights law, 
not mean only until changed by constitutional seeking monetary damages against member of 
amendment but it also means until provided by Board of Pardons was barred as members of 
Legislature in law-making procedure set forth Board were absolutely immune from damages 
in Constitution, and the authorization to "other- liability for actions taken in performance of 
wise provide by law" was carried out by enact- their official duties regarding granting or deny-
ment of 1951 statute which created board of ing of parole 42 U S C A § 1983 Houtz v 
pardons in valid form Const art 7, § 12, art Deland, 1989, 718 F Supp 1497 Civil Rights 
23, §§ 1-3, U C A 1 9 5 3 , 77-62-2 Adnano v <&=> 1376(7) 
§ 7 7 - 2 7 - 3 . Repealed by Laws 1985, c. 213, § 10 
§ 7 7 - 2 7 - 4 . Chairperson and vice chairperson 
(1) The governor shall select one of the members of the board to serve as 
chairperson and board administrator at the governor's pleasure. The chairper-
son may exercise the duties and powers, in addition to those established by this 
chapter, necessary for the administration of daily operations of the board, 
including personnel, budgetary matters, panel appointments, and scheduling of 
hearings. 
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(2) The chairperson shall appoint a vice chairperson to act in the absence of 
the chairperson. 
Laws 1985, c. 198, § 8; Laws 1989, c. 112, § 1; Laws 1990, c. 195, § 3. 
Library References 
Pardon and Parole <3=»55.1. 
Westlaw Key Number Search: 284k55.1. 
§ 7 7 - 2 7 - 5 . Board of Pardons and Parole authority 
(l)(a) The Board of Pardons and Parole shall determine by majority decision 
when and under what conditions, subject to this chapter and other laws of the 
state, persons committed to serve sentences in class A misdemeanor cases at 
penal or correctional facilities which are under the jurisdiction of the Depart-
ment of Corrections, and all felony cases except treason or impeachment or as 
otherwise limited by law, may be released upon parole, pardoned, restitution 
ordered, or have their fines, forfeitures, or restitution remitted, or their sen-
tences commuted or terminated. 
(b) The board may sit together or in panels to conduct hearings. The chair 
shall appoint members to the panels in any combination and in accordance 
with rules promulgated by the board, except in hearings involving commuta-
tion and pardons. The chair may participate on any panel and when doing 
so is chair of the panel. The chair of the board may designate the chair for 
any other panel. 
(c) No restitution may be ordered, no fine, forfeiture, or restitution remit-
ted, no parole, pardon, or commutation granted or sentence terminated, 
except after a full hearing before the board or the board's appointed examin-
er in open session. Any action taken under this subsection other than by a 
majority of the board shall be affirmed by a majority of the board. 
(d) A commutation or pardon may be granted only after a full hearing 
before the board. 
(e) The board shall determine restitution in an amount that does not 
exceed complete restitution if determined by the court in accordance with 
Section 77-38a-302. 
(2)(a) In the case of original parole grant hearings, rehearings, and parole 
revocation hearings, timely prior notice of the time and place of the hearing 
shall be given to the defendant, the county or district attorney's office responsi-
ble for prosecution of the case, ihe sentencing court, law enforcement officials 
responsible for the defendant's arrest and conviction, and whenever possible, 
the victim or the victim's family. 
(b) Notice to the victim, his representative, or his family shall include 
information provided in Section 77-27-9.5, and any related rules made by 
the board under that section. This information shall be provided in terms 
that are reasonable for the lay person to understand. 
(3) Decisions of the board in cases involving paroles, pardons, commutations 
or terminations of sentence, restitution, or remission of fines or forfeitures are 
455 
§ 77-27-5 £ODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
final and are not subject to judicial review. Nothing in this section prevents 
the obtaining or enforcement of a civil judgment, including restitution as 
provided in Section 77-27-6. 
(4) This chapter may not be construed a£ a denial of or limitation of the 
governor's power to grant respite or reprieves in all cases of convictions for 
offenses against the state, except treason or conviction on impeachment. 
However, respites or reprieves may not extend beyond the next session of the 
Board of Pardons and Parole and the board, at that session, shall continue or 
terminate the respite or reprieve, or it may commute the punishment, or 
pardon the offense as provided. In the c^se of conviction for treason, the 
governor may suspend execution of the sentence until the case is reported to 
the Legislature at its next session. The Legislature shall then either pardon or 
commute the sentence, or direct its execution-
(5) In determining when, where, and und^r what conditions offenders serv-
ing sentences may be paroled, pardoned, have restitution ordered, or have their 
fines or forfeitures remitted, or their sentences commuted or terminated, the 
board shall consider whether the persons have made or are prepared to make 
xes\\tvft\on as ascei\2&cie& m accordance wftY> ^  ^asiA'aife «iA pt rafc&ares ck 
Section 77-38a-302, as a condition of any parole, pardon, remission of fines or 
forfeitures, or commutation or termination of sentence. 
(6) In determining whether parole may be terminated, the board shall 
consider the offense committed by the parolee, the parole period as provided in 
Section 76-3-202, and in accordance with Section 77-27-13. 
Laws 1985, c. 213, § 1; Laws 1986, c. 22, § 2; J>ws 1988, c. 172, § 2; Laws 1990, c. 
195, § 4; Laws 1993, c. 38, § 102; Laws 1994, c. 13, § 33; Laws 1995, c. 301, § 4, eff. 
May 1, 1995; Laws 1996, c. 100, § 4, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 2002, c. 35, § 9, eff. May 
6, 2002. 
Cross Referents 
Extradition, payment of costs, see § 77-30-24 
Administrative Code References 
Rescission hearings, see Utah Admin. Code 671-310. 
Library References 
Pardon and Parole <S=>23 1, 28, 59, 62, 64 1, C.J S Pardon and Parole §§ 1 to 2, 4 to 6, 11 
85, 92. to 16, 22 to 26, 29 to 30, 34 to 41, 55, 57, 
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 284k23.1; 75, 79 to 80, 87. 
2Mk2B; 2&4V59; 2Mk62; 2&4k64.1; 
284k85; 284k92 
Notes of Decisions 
In general 2 Due process 4 
Authority of board 7 Extraordinary relief 20 
Civil rights action 8 Habeas corpus 21 
Class B misdemeanor 9 judicial review 18 
Conditions to paroles 10 Jurisdiction of parole board 15 
Construction of sentence imposed 11 Mootness 14 
Double jeopardy 3 Pleadings 1 6 
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Note 21 
of Appeals from reviewing dismissal of petition P.2d 696, certiorari granted, affirmed 870 P.2d 
for writ of habeas corpus challenging parole 914. Habeas Corpus <S=» 516.1 
hearing determination by Board that alleged statute precluding review of decisions of 
violation of state and federal constitutional
 B o a r d o f P a r d o n s d i d n o t p r e c l u d e prisoner 
rights; nght to petition for habeas relief from
 from a l l e g i n g , 0 n appeal from dismissal of his 
constitutional rights violations was guaranteed
 i t i o n for w r f t o f h a b e a g t h a t m a n n e r 
nV!12U 77S^m P °^f ^ u'J i « w h i c h h i s P a r o l e h e a r i n S w a s conducted de-
U.C.A.1953, 77-27-5(3). Padilla v. Utah Bd. of . , , . j 1 j J u- * J 
Pardons, 1992, 839 P.2d 874. Habeas Corpus " l e d him procedural due process and subjected 
«» 516.1, Habeas Corpus « » 814 h l m t o d o u b l e f ° P a r d y . a s pnsoner did not 
TT i * -1 i_i . dispute merits or parole decision itself. U.C.A. 
Habeas corpus was not available as postre-
 1 Q I5- H t h D T d 1990 790 
lease remedy to modify release date ordered by « ~
 t '„ rt T T 1 ' ,0 J*~ OAT 
the Board of Pardons, even though parolee's P 2 d 4 9 Habeas Corpus ^ 845 
original scheduled parole date was rescinded by If conditional termination of sentence was 
Board of Pardons one day before parole date, void, convict had no complaint as to recommit-
Board had right to rely on any factors known at ment to prison, since compact pursuant to 
the time, including parolee's drug history, or which he was released would be nudum pac-
later adduced at hearing ordered and had dis- turn, and he could be afforded no relief on 
cretion to determine weight to be given to the habeas corpus from recommitment. Mansell v. 
factors. U.C.A.1953, 76-3-202(1), (3)(c), (5), Turner, 1963, 14 Utah 2d 352, 384 P.2d 394. 
77-27-5(3). Northern v. Barnes, 1992, 825 Habeas Corpus <&> 517 
§ 7 7 - 2 7 - 5 *3 • Meritless and bad faith litigation 
(1) For purposes of this section: 
(a) "Convicted" means a conviction by entry of a plea of guilty or nolo 
contendere, guilty and mentally ill, no contest, and conviction of any crime or 
offense. 
(b) "Prisoner" means a person who has been convicted of a crime and is 
incarcerated for that crime or is being held in custody for trial or sentencing. 
(2) In any case filed in state or federal court in which a prisoner submits a 
claim that the court finds to be without merit and brought or asserted in bad 
faith, the Board of Pardons and Parole and any county jail administrator may 
consider that finding in any early release decisions concerning the prisoner. 
Laws 1996, c. 161, § 6, eff. April 29, 1996. 
Library References 
Pardon and Parole <S=»49. 
Westlaw Key Number Search- 284k49. 
§ 77—27—5.5. Review procedure—Commutation 
(1) The Board of Pardons and Parole may consider the commutation of a 
death sentence only to life without parole. 
(2) Only the person who has been sentenced to death or his counsel may 
petition the Board of Pardons and Parole for commutation. 
(3) The petition shall be in writing, signed personally by the person sen-
tenced to death, and shall include a statement of the grounds upon which the 
petitioner seeks review. 
(4) The state shall be permitted to respond in writing to the petition as may 
be established by board rules. 
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Note 2 
(5) The board shall review the petition and determine whether the petition 
presents a substantial issue which has not been reviewed in the judicial process. 
(6) The board shall not consider legal issues, including constitutional issues, 
which: 
(a) have been reviewed previously by the courts; 
(b) should have been raised during the judicial process; or 
(c) if based on new information, are subject to judicial review. 
(7)(a) If the board does not find a substantial issue, the board shall deny the 
hearing to the petitioner. 
(b) If the board finds a substantial issue, the board shall conduct a hearing 
in which the petitioner and the state may present evidence and argument as 
may be provided by board rules. 
Laws 1992, c. 140, § 1, Laws 1994, c. 13, § 34. 
Library References 
Pardon and Parole <S=:>28 
Westlaw Key Number Search 284k28 
C J S Pardon and Parole §§ 4, 34 to 41 
United States Supreme Court 
Clemency hearings, 
Death sentences, clemency hearings, due 
process, self-incrimination, executive 
discretion, see Ohio Adult Parole Au-
thority v Woodard, U S Ohio 1998, 118 
S Ct 1244, 523 U S 272 
Commutation, 
Commutation of death sentence to long 
term sentences, see Rose v Hodges, 
U S Tenn 1975, 96 S Ct 175, 423 U S 
19, 46 L Ed 2d 162, rehearing denied 
96 S C t 888, 423 U S 1092, 47 
L E d 2 d 104 
Commutation of life sentence, due pro-
cess, see Connecticut Bd of Pardons v 
Dumschat, U S Conn 1981, 101 S C t 
2460, 452 U S 458, 69 L Ed 2d 158 
Death or life imprisonment without possi-
bility of parole, sentence commuted by 
governor, Bnggs instruction, see Cali-
fornia v Ramos, U S Cal 1983, 103 
S Ct 3446, 463 U S 992, 77 L Ed 2d 
1171, on remand 207 Cal Rptr 800, 37 
Cal 3d 136, 689 P 2d 430 
Habeas corpus, death penalty, inaccurate 
instruction on governor s power to 
commute life sentence without parole, 
harmless-error standard, see Calderon 
v Coleman, U S Cal 1998, 119 S C t 
500, 525 U S 141 
Notes of Decis ions 
Due process 2 
Retrospective and ex post facto laws 
1. Retrospective and ex post facto laws 
Application of statute creating new and high-
er substantive standard for obtaining commuta-
tion hearing, to petition for commutation hear-
ing for crime which occurred before statute was 
enacted would violate state constitutional prohi-
bition of ex post facto laws Const Art 1, § 18, 
Art 7, § 12, U C A 1953, 77-27-5 5(6, 7) An-
drews v Utah Bd of Pardons, 1992, 836 P 2d 
790 Constitutional Law <3» 203 Pardon And 
Parole <S» 22 
Board of Pardons amended order denying 
request for second commutation hearing ap-
plied constitutionally correct criteria, rather 
than commutation hearing standard of statute 
enacted after commission of crime, therefore, 
Board did not violate constitutional prohibition 
of ex post facto laws in denying second commu-
tation hearing Const Art 1, § 18, Art 7, 
§ 12, U C A 1953, 77-27-5 5(6, 7) Andrews v 
Utah Bd of Pardons, 1992, 836 P 2d 790 Con-
stitutional Law <£=> 203, Pardon And Parole @=» 
22 
2. Due process 
Board of Pardons did not deny petitioner due 
process of law in its reconsideration of his peti-
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United States Supreme Court 
Restitution, 
In general, 
Probation, revocation for failure of indi-
gent defendant to pay fine and restitu-
tion, equal protection, see Bearden v 
Georgia, U S Ga 1983, 103 S Ct 2064, 
461 U S 660, 76 L Ed 2d 221, on re-
mand 167 Ga App 334, 308 S E 2d 63 
Amount of restitution, 
Restitution calculation, losses caused by 
offense of conviction, unauthorized use 
of credit card, see Hughey v U S , 
U S Tex 1990, 110 S Ct 1979, 495 U S 
411, 109 L E d 2 d 408, on remand 907 
F 2 d 3 9 
Restitution as condition of probation, 
Bankruptcy, dischargeability of restitu-
tion obligations imposed as conditions 
of probation, see Pennsylvania Dept of 
Public Welfare v Davenport U S Pa 
1990, 110 S C t 2126, 495 U S 552, 
109 L Ed 2d 588 
Bankruptcy, restitution obligation dis-
charge, condition of probation, see Kel-
ly v Robinson, U S Conn 1986, 107 
S Ct 353, 479 U S 36, 93 L Ed 2d 216 
Consideration of alternatives to incarcer-
ation before revocation, see Black v 
Romano, U S Mo 1985, 105 S Ct 2254, 
471 U S 606, 85 L Ed 2d 636, rehear-
ing denied 105 S C t 3548, 473 U S 
921, 87 L Ed 2d 671 
Failure of indigent defendant to pay fine 
and restitution, equal protection, see 
Bearden v Georgia, U S Ga 1983, 103 
S C t 2064, 461 U S 660, 76 L Ed 2d 
221, on remand 167 Ga App 334, 308 
S E 2d 63 
Resentencing, drug possession, see U S 
v Granderson, U S Ga 1994, 114 S Ct 
1259, 511 U S 39, 127 L Ed 2d 611 
Notes of Decis ions 
In general 1 
Effect of parole termination 2 
1. In general 
Board of Pardons and Parole had authority to 
order restitution for three robbery offenses as 
condition of parole even through original sen-
tencing court had not ordered restitution as 
part of underlying sentence U C A 1 9 5 3 , 
77-27-5 77-27-6 Stilling v Utah Bd of Par-
dons and Parole, 1997, 933 P 2d 391 308 Utah 
Adv Rep 39 Pardon And Parole ^ 64 1 
Authority of Board of Pardons and Paroles to 
impose restitution as condition of parole is not 
limited to instances in which sentencing trial 
court has failed to fulfill its statutory duty to 
consider and impose restitution unless court 
finds it inappropriate U C A 1 9 5 3 77-27-5, 
77-27-6 U C A 1 9 5 3 , 76-3-201 (1983) Still-
ing v Utah Bd of Pardons and Parole 1997 
933 P 2d 391, 308 Utah Adv Rep 39 Pardon 
And Parole <$=> 64 1 
2. Effect of parole termination 
After parolee's sentence and parole were ter-
minated, Board of Pardons and Parole lacked 
jurisdiction to issue restitution order that it then 
forwarded to sentencing court to be entered as 
a civil judgment U C A 1953, 77-27-5(1), 
77-27-6(2, 4) State v Schultz 2002, 56 P 3d 
974, 456 Utah Adv Rep 28 2002 UT App 297 
Pardon And Parole <S^  93 
Board of Pardons and Parole s restitution or-
der issued after parolee's sentence and parole 
were terminated was not a nunc pro tunc order 
that related back to Board's special attention 
hearing that was held when Board still had 
jurisdiction over parolee and thus civil judg-
ment against parolee that sentencing court im-
posed pursuant to the order was invalid 
U C A 1 9 5 3 77-27-5(1) 77-27-6(2 4) State v 
Schultz, 2002, 56 P 3d 974, 456 Utah Adv Rep 
28, 2002 UT App 297 Pardon And Parole <3=> 
93 
§ 77—27-7. Parole or hearing dates—Interview—Hearings—Report of al-
ienists—Mental competency 
(1) The Board of Pardons and Parole shall determine within six months after 
the date of an offender's commitment to the custody of the Department of 
Corrections, for serving a sentence upon conviction of a felony or class A 
misdemeanor offense, a date upon which the offender shall be afforded a 
hearing to establish a date of release or a date for a rehearing, and shall 
promptly notify the offender of the date 
(2) Before reaching a final decision to release any offender under this 
chapter, the chair shall cause the offender to appear before the board, its panel, 
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or any appointed hearing officer, who shall personally interview the offender to 
consider his fitness for release and verify as far as possible information 
furnished from other sources. Any offender may waive a personal appearance 
before the board. Any offender outside of the state shall, if ordered by the 
board, submit to a courtesy hearing to be held by the appropriate authority in 
the jurisdiction in which the offender is housed in lieu of an appearance before 
the board. The offender shall be promptly notified in writing of the board's 
decision. 
(3)(a) In the case of an offender convicted of violating or attempting to 
violate any of the provisions of Section 76-5-301.1, Subsection 
76-5-302(l)(b)(vi), Section 76-5-402, 76-5-402.1, 76-5-402.2, 76-5-402.3, 
76-5-403, 76-5-403.1, 76-5-404, 76-5-404.1, or 76-5-405, the chair may 
appoint one or more alienists who shall examine the offender within six months 
prior to a hearing at which an original parole date is granted on any offense 
listed in this Subsection (3). 
(b) The alienists shall report in writing the results of the examination to the 
board prior to the hearing. The report of the appointed alienists shall 
specifically address the question of the offender's current mental condition 
and attitudes as they relate to any danger the offender may pose to children 
or others if the offender is released on parole. 
(4) The parolee may petition the board for termination of lifetime parole as 
provided in Section 76-3-202 in the case of a person convicted of a first degree 
felony violation or convicted of attempting to violate Section 76-5-301.1, 
Subsection 76-5-302(l)(b)(vi), Section 76-5-402, 76-5-402.1, 76-5-402.2, 
76-5-402.3, 76-5-403, 76-5-403.1, 76-5-404.1, or 76-5-405. 
(5) In any case where an offender's mental competency is questioned by the 
board, the chair may appoint one or more alienists to examine the offender and 
report in writing to the board, specifically addressing the issue of competency. 
(6) In accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemak-
ing Act, the board shall make rules governing: 
(a) the hearing process; 
(b) alienist examination; and 
(c) parolee petitions for termination of parole. 
Laws 1985, c. 213, § 3; Laws 1986, c 22, § 4, Laws 1988, c 150, § 1, Laws 1990, c. 
195, § 5; Laws 1994, c. 13, § 36, Laws 1996, c. 100, § 5, eff. April 29, 1996, Laws 
1998, c. 69, § 3, eff May 4, 1998, Laws 2001, c. 301, § 8, eff April 30, 2001, Laws 
2001, 1st Sp. Sess., c 4, § 3, eff. July 5, 2001 
Administrative Code References 
Pardons and parole, rules and regulations, see Utah Admin Code 671 
Library References 
Pardon and Parole <S=>59, 60 C J S Pardon and Parole §§ 52, 55 
Westlaw Key Number Searches* 284k59, 
284k60 
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Note 15 
tional rights U C A 1953, 77-27-7(1), U C A 
1953, 77-27-7 (Repealed) Malek v Sawaya, 
1986, 730 P 2d 629 Habeas Corpus <£=> 506 
§ 7 7 - 2 7 - 8 . Record of hearing 
(1) A verbatim record of proceedings before the Board of Pardons and Parole 
shall be maintained by a certified shorthand reporter or suitable electronic 
recording device, except when the board dispenses with a record in a particular 
hearing or a portion of the proceedings. 
(2) When the hearing involves the commutation of a death sentence, a 
certified shorthand reporter, in addition to mechanical means, shall record all 
proceedings except when the board dispenses with a record for the purpose of 
deliberations in executive session. The compensation of the reporter shall be 
determined by the board. The reporter shall immediately file with the board 
the original record and when requested shall with reasonable diligence furnish 
a transcription or copy of the record upon payment of reasonable fees as 
determined by the board. 
(3) When the party in interest affirms by affidavit that he is unable to pay for 
a transcript or copy of the record which is necessary for further proceedings 
available to him, and that affidavit is not refuted, the board may order the 
reporter to furnish to the party in interest a transcript, or a copy of the record, 
or so much of it as is reasonably applicable to any further proceedings, or a 
copy of the recording, at the expense of the state, to the party in interest. 
Laws 1985, c 213, § 4, Laws 1994, c 13, § 37 
Administrative Code References 
Records and transcripts of hearings, >ee Utah Admin Code 671-304 
Library References 
Pardon and Parole <s»59 
Westlaw Key Number Search 284k59 
C J S Pardon and Parole § 55 
§ 77—27-9. Parole proceedings 
(l)(a) The Board of Pardons and Parole may pardon or parole any offender 
or commute or terminate the sentence of any offender committed to a penal or 
correctional facility under the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections for 
a felony or class A misdemeanor except as provided m Subsection (2). 
(b) The board may not release any offender before the minimum term has 
been served unless the board finds mitigating circumstances which justify the 
release and unless the board has granted a full hearing, in open session, after 
previous notice of the time and place of the hearing, and recorded the 
proceedings and decisions of the board. 
(c) The board may not pardon or parole any offender or commute or 
terminate the sentence of any offender unless the board has granted a full 
hearing, in open session, after previous notice of the time and place of the 
hearing, and recorded the proceedings and decisions of the board. 
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(d) The release of an offender shall be at the initiative of the board, which 
shall consider each case as the offender becomes eligible. However, a 
prisoner may submit his own application, subject to the rules of the board 
promulgated in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative 
Rulemaking Act. 
(2)(a) A person sentenced to prison prior to April 29, 1996, for a first degree 
felony involving child kidnapping, a violation of Section 76-5-301.1; aggravat-
ed kidnapping, a violation of Section 76-5-302; rape of a child, a violation of 
Section 76-5-402.1; object rape of a child, a violation of Section 76-5-402.3; 
sodomy upon a child, a violation of Section 76-5-403.1; aggravated sexual 
abuse of a child, a violation of Subsection 76-5-404.1(4); aggravated sexual 
assault, a violation of Section 76-5-405; or a prior offense as described in 
Section 76-3-407, may not be eligible for release on parole by the Board of 
Pardons and Parole until the offender has fully completed serving the minimum 
mandatory sentence imposed by the court. This subsection supersedes any 
other provision of law. 
(b) The board may not parole any offender or commute or terminate the 
sentence of any offender before the offender has served the minimum term 
for the offense, if the offender was sentenced prior to April 29, 1996, and if: 
(i) the offender was convicted of forcible sexual abuse, forcible sodomy, 
rape, aggravated assault, kidnapping, aggravated kidnapping, or aggravat-
ed sexual assault as defined in Title 76, Chapter 5, Offenses Against the 
Person; and 
(ii) the victim of the offense was under 18 years of age at the time the 
offense was committed. 
(c) For a crime committed on or after April 29, 1996, the board may parole 
any offender under Subsections (2)(b)(i) and (ii) for lifetime parole as provid-
ed in Section 77-27-9. 
(d) The board may not pardon or parole any offender or commute or 
terminate the sentence of any offender who is sentenced to life in prison 
without parole except as provided in Subsection (6). 
(e) On or after April 27, 1992, the board may commute a sentence of death 
only to a sentence of life in prison without parole. 
(f) The restrictions imposed in Subsections 77-27-9(2)(d) and (e) apply to 
all cases that come before the Board of Pardons and Parole on or after April 
27, 1992. 
(3) The board may issue subpoenas to compel the attendance of witnesses 
and the production of evidence, to administer oaths, and to take testimony for 
the purpose of any investigation by the board or any of its members or by a 
designated hearing examiner in the performance of its duties. A person who 
willfully disobeys a properly served subpoena issued by the board is guilty of a 
class B misdemeanor. 
(4)(a) The board may adopt rules consistent with law for its government, 
meetings and hearings, the conduct of proceedings before it, the parole and 
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pardon of offenders, the commutation and termination of sentences, and the 
general conditions under which parole may be granted and revoked. 
(b) The rules shall ensure an adequate opportunity for victims to partici-
pate at hearings held under this chapter, as provided in Section 77-27-9.5. 
(c) The rules may allow the board to establish reasonable and equitable 
time limits on the presentations by all participants in hearings held under this 
chapter. 
(5) The board does not provide counseling or therapy for victims as a part of 
their participation in any hearing under this chapter. 
(6) The board may parole a person sentenced to life in prison without parole 
if the board finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person is perma-
nently incapable of being a threat to the safety of society 
L a w s 1985 , c 2 1 3 , § 5, L a w s 1986, c 22 , § 5, L a w s 1986, c 4 1 , § 3 , L a w s 1988, c 
172, § 3 , L a w s 1992, c 142 § 5, Laws 1994, c 13, § 38 , L a w s 1995, c 337 , § 12, eff 
M a y 1, 1995 , L a w s 1995, 1st S p Sess , c 10, § 12, eff April 29 , 1996, L a w s 1996, c 
40 , § 14, eff April 29 , 1996, L a w s 1996, c 100, § 6, eff April 29 , 1996, L a w s 2003 , c 
149, § 6, eff M a y 5, 2003 
Cross References 
Sex offenses, applicability of sentencing provisions, see § 76-5-406 3 
Administrative Code References 
News media and public access, see Utah Admin Code 671-302 
Notification of hearings, see Utah Admin Code 671-202 
Library References 
Pardon and Parole <&*2 8 44 50 58,59 C J S Pardon and Parole §§ 4 34 to 41 52 to 
Westlaw Key Number Searches 284k28, 55 
284k44 284L50 284k58 284k59 
United States Supreme Court 
Parole, nal and Correctional Complex, 
Liberty interest in parole release, see U S Neb 1979, 99 S Ct 2100, 442 U S 
Board of Pardons v Allen, U S Mont 1 60 L Ed 2d 668 on remand 602 F 2d 
1987, 107 S Ct 2415, 482 U S 369, 96 155 
L Ed 2d 303 Retroactive change in frequency of parole 
Parole release, expectation as protected reconsideration hearings, significant 
liberty interest, see Jago v Van Curen, risk of increased punishment, ex post 
U S O h i o l 9 8 1 , 102 S O 31, 454 U S facto, see Garner v Jones, U S Ga 
14 70 L Ed 2d 13 2000, 120 S Ct 1362, 529 U S 244 
Preparole conditional supervision, due _ 
process protections, see Young v Har- Revocation of parole, 
per, U S O k l a l 9 9 7 , 117 S Ct 1148 Habeas corpus, parole revocation, m-cus-
520 U S 143, 137 L Ed 2d 270 t0<ty requirement, collateral conse-
quences, see Spencer v Kemna, 
Parole hearings, U S MO 1998, 118 S Ct 978, 523 U S 
Deferral of parole hearings ex post facto, 1 
see California Dept of Corrections v 
Morales, U S Cal 1995, 115 S Ct 1597, Right to parole, 
514 U S 499, 131 L Ed 2d 588, on re- Scope of agency authority, statute deny-
mand 56 F 3d 46 ing early release foi prisoners convict-
Requisites of parole procedure, see ed of violent offenses, regulation deny-
Greenholtz v Inmates of Nebraska Pe- ing early release to prisoners convicted 
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Cross References 
State prison, victim notification of offender's release, see § 64-13-14 7 
Administrative Code References 
Notification of Board decision, see Utah Admin Code 671-305 
Library References 
Pardon and Parole @=»57 1 
Westlaw Key Number Search 284k57 1 
§ 77—27—10. Conditions of parole—Rulemaking—Intensive early release 
parole program 
(l)(a) When the Board of Pardons and Parole releases an offender on parole, 
it shall issue to the parolee a certificate setting forth the conditions of parole 
which he shall accept and agree to as evidenced by his signature affixed to the 
agreement. 
(b) A copy of the agreement shall be delivered to the Department of 
Corrections and a copy shall be given to the parolee. The original shall 
remain with the board's file. 
(2) If an offender convicted of violating or attempting to violate Section 
76-5-301.1, Subsection 76-5-302(1), Section 76-5-402, 76-5-402.1, 
76-5-402.2, 76-5-402.3, 76-5-403, 76-5-403.1, 76-5-404, 76-5-404.1, or 
76-5-405, is released on parole, the board shall order outpatient mental health 
counseling and treatment as a condition of parole. The board shall develop 
standards and conditions of parole under this subsection in accordance with 
Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. This subsection 
does not apply to intensive early release parole. 
(3)(a) In addition to the conditions set out in Subsection (1), the board may 
place offenders in an intensive early release parole program. The board shall 
determine the conditions of parole which are reasonably necessary to protect 
the community as well as to protect the interests of the offender and to assist 
the offender to lead a law-abiding life. 
(b) The offender is eligible for this program only if he: 
(i) has not been convicted of a sexual offense; or 
(ii) has not been sentenced pursuant to Section 76-3-406. 
(c) The department shall: 
(i) promulgate rules in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah 
Administrative Rulemaking Act, for operation of the program; 
(ii) adopt and implement internal management policies for operation of 
the program; 
(iii) determine whether or not to refer an offender into this program 
within 120 days from the date the offender is committed to prison by the 
sentencing court; and 
(iv) make the final recommendation to the board regarding the place-
ment of an offender into the program. 
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Note 5 
(d) The department shall not consider credit for time served in a county 
jail awaiting trial or sentencing when calculating the 120 day period. 
(e) The prosecuting attorney or sentencing court may refer an offender for 
consideration by the department for participation in the program. 
(f) The board shall determine whether or not to place an offender into this 
program within 30 days of receiving the department's recommendation. 
(4) This program shall be implemented by the department within the existing 
budget. 
(5) During the time the offender is on parole, the department shall collect 
from the offender the monthly supervision fee authorized by Section 64-13-21. 
Laws 1985, c. 213, § 6; Laws 1986, c 22, § 6, Laws 1993, c. 35, § 1; Laws 1993, c 
220, § 4, Laws 1994, c 13, § 41, Laws 1996, c 100, § 7, eff April 29, 1996 
Cross References 
Sentence, term and construction, see § 77-18-4 
Library References 
Pardon and Parole <®=*64 1, 69 C J S Pardon and Parole § 65 
Westlaw Key Number Searches 284k64 1, 
284k69 
In general 1 
Acceptance or rejection by prisoner 
Due process ° 
Notes of Decisions 
Enforcement 4 
Restitution 6 
Right to hearing 
1. In general 
Parolees do not enjoy absolute liberty to 
which every citizen is entitled but only condi-
tional liberty properly dependent on observance 
of special parole restrictions U S v Lewis, 
1995, 71 F 3d 358 Pardon And Parole &* 64 1 
Board of parole may, in its discretion attach 
conditions to paroles and termination of sen-
tences Vnezev Turner 1966 18 Utah 2d 233 
419 P 2 d 769 Pardon And Parole <&* 64 1 
2. Due process 
Once paroled, offenders have a liberty interest 
that is limited by the restrictions that govern 
parole it is nevertheless a liberty interest which 
is entitled to due process protection U S C A 
Const Amend 14 Linden v State, Dept of 
Corrections, 2003, 81 P 3d 802, 499 Utah Adv 
Rep 34, 2003 UT App 402 Constitutional Law 
®» 272 5, Pardon And Parole <&* 64 1 
3. Acceptance or rejection by prisoner 
Authority of Board of Pardons under Consti-
tution and statute to release prisoners on condi-
tion is plenary and while prisoner may reject 
conditions and serve out term, he may not ac-
cept them, obtain release from confinement, 
and then blithely contend that his sentence is 
terminated Const art 1, §§ 3, 9, 26, art 7, 
^ 12, U S C A C o n s t Amends 5, 6, 14, U C A 
1953, 77-62-3 Mansell v Turner, 1963, 14 
Utah 2d 352, 384 P 2d 394 Pardon And Parole 
<3=»65 
4. Enforcement 
Board of Pardons did not violate fundamental 
fairness when it refused to credit inmate's time 
served in secured treatment program as condi-
tion of probation against inmate's prison sen-
tence, when sentencing court grants probation, 
it must have adequate means of enforcing con-
ditions of that probation and, without threat of 
potential future incarceration, conditions of 
probation become meaningless Const Art 1, 
$ 7 Rawhngs v Holden, 1994, 869 P 2d 958 
Constitutional Law @=» 272 5, Pardon And Pa-
role <&* 64 1 
f5. Right to hearing 
Inmate who objected to restitution order im-
posed by Board of Pardons and Parole as condi-
tion of parole was not entitled to full hearing 
before Board on his objections, where he in-
stead chose to seek extraordinary relief via peti-
tion for writ of habeas corpus U C A 1953, 
76-3-20 l(4)(e), 77-27-5, Utah Admin Code 
071-403-2 Monson v Carver, 1996, 928 P 2d 
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(Order of the Court, dated 5-24-2004) 
NATALIE A. WINTCH (#9213) 
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MARK SHURTLEFF(#4666) 
Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondents 
PO Box 140812 
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0812 
Telephone: (801) 366-0216 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL BRIAN WHITEMAN, ORDER OF THE COURT 
Petitioner, 
vs. : Case No. 040900113 
CLINT FRIEL, et. al., Judge L.A. DEVER 
Respondents. : 
Having carefully reviewed the pleadings submitted by both parties, being fully advised in 
the premises, and good cause appearing, the Court hereby enters the following Order of the 
Court. 
ORDER 
FINDINGS OF FACTS 
1. A jury convicted Petitioner of murder, a first degree felony. On November 22, 1993, he 
was sentenced to a maximum mandatory term of five-years-to-life. 
2. On November 12, 1996, the Board held an original hearing which resulted in a rehearing 
set for April 2003. 
3. On April 5, 1999, Petitioner's sentence was amended, showing a change from a 
"maximum mandatory term of five years and which may be fore life" to a "not less than 
five years and which may be for life." 
4. In preparation for the April 5, 1999 hearing, a new Presentence Investigation Report was 
prepared. 
5. Petitioner requested a redetermination hearing. 
6. The Board conducted a Special Attention Review. After considering the information 
Petitioner provided, the Board determined not to change the previously scheduled April 
2003 rehearing. 
7. Petitioner was informed that in assessing the guidelines/matrix, the Board "considers 
sentences imposed on convictions in other states, not whether the other state calls the 
offense a misdemeanor or felony. This is based on the fact that felonies and 
misdemeanors differ from state to state. An offense Utah might classify as a felony, 
2 
California may classify as a misdemeanor. So, if the sentence imposed by California 
corresponds to a Utah felony sentence, the offense is counted as a felony on the matrix. 
Your matrix/guidelines have been refigured with the new presentence investigation 
report, but no change was made in the final guideline time." 
8. On April 10, 2003, the Board conducted a rehearing and decided to parole Petitioner on 
April 6, 2004. The Board also ordered two special conditions of parole: (1) cooperate 
with transitional services which may include a Community Correctional Center as 
directed by Adult Probation and Parole; (2) successfully complete mental health therapy 
to address substance abuse and cognitive restructuring issues. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The standard of review in Board cases is well established: while the Court "must review 
the fairness of the process by which the Board undertakes its sentencing function,. . . [the 
court does] not sit as a panel of review on the result." Neel v. Holden, 886 P.2d 1097, 
1100 (Utah 1994) (emphasis in original) (quoting Lancaster v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 869 
P.2d 945, 947 (Utah 1994) (citing Labrum v. Utah State Bd of Pardons, 870 P.2d 902, 
910 (Utah 1993))). 
2. Petitioner complains the Board of Pardons (Board) adjusted his California sentences to 
coincide with what the sentences would be in Utah when it prepared his Criminal History 
Assessment and Time Matrix Guidelines. The Board has the right to "rely on any factors 
3 
known . . . or later adduced . . . , and the weight to be afforded such factors in deciding 
whether [a prospective parolee] pose[s] a societal risk . . . are all matters within the 
discretion of the Board. They are precisely the kinds of issues that are not subject to 
judicial review . . . ." Northern v. Barnes, 825 P.2d 696, 699 (Utah App. 1992). See also 
Walker v. State, Dept. of Corrections, 902 P.2d 148, 150 (Utah App. 1995) ("[i]t is within 
the discretion of the Board to weigh all of the evidence . . .") . 
3. The Board properly exercised its discretion in weighing Petitioner's California offenses. 
To maintain consistency, the Board ''considers sentences imposed on convictions in other 
states, not whether the other state calls the offense a misdemeanor or felony. This is 
based on the fact that felonies and misdemeanors differ from state to state." For example, 
in California, Petitioner was convicted of Attempted Grand Theft and sentenced to thirty-
six months probation and 360 days in jail. Although California considered this offense a 
misdemeanor, in Utah the sentence imposed would make the offense a felony. Therefore, 
the Board treated this offense as a felony as the sentence comports with a felony in Utah. 
Five of Petitioner's California offenses were determined to be felonies as the sentences 
constituted felonies in Utah. As a result, Petitioner was properly attributed with five prior 
felony convictions on his Criminal History Assessment. As noted previously, the Board 
has discretion in determining the weight to be afforded in such circumstances, and these 
"are precisely the kinds of issues that are not subject to judicial review . . . ." Northern, 
4 
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825 P.2d at 699. The Board did not abuse its discretion when it weighed Petitioner's 
prior California sentences. 
Petitioner complains that his incarceration was extended due to the Board's adjusting his 
California sentences to comport with Utah sentences. Petitioner fails to state a claim. 
Utah courts have consistently held that "the state sentencing guidelines do not have the 
force and effect of law." Preece v. House, 886 P.2d 508, 511 (Utah 1994) (citing Labrum 
v. Utah State Board of Pardons, 870 P.2d 902, 911-12 (Utah 1993)). Further, "any 
'expectation of release' derived from the guidelines is at best tenuous." Id. "So long as 
the period of incarceration decided upon by the board of pardons falls within an inmate's 
applicable indeterminate range, then that decision, absent unusual circumstances, cannot 
be arbitrary and capricious." Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1023 (Utah 1996) 
(quotation omitted). 
In this case, Petitioner was sentenced to five-years-to-life. The Board, in exercising its 
discretion, could have denied Petitioner any parole date, resulting in the maximum term 
of life in prison. Petitioner's sentence has not expired. Petitioner requested a 
redetermination hearing based on his complaint that the Board adjusted his California 
sentences to reflect Utah convictions. The Board reviewed the request and determined 
not to change his status. The Board exercised its discretion; this is not arbitrary or 
capricious. 
5 
Petitioner requests the Court order his sentence and parole be terminated. These remedies 
are unavailable. The Utah Supreme Court has clearly held that a district court exceeds its 
authority when it orders an inmate released. Preece v. House, 886 P.2d 508, 512 (Utah 
1994). "In our indeterminate sentencing scheme, the board of pardons acts as a 
sentencing entity, having exclusive authority to 'determine the actual number of years a 
defendant is to serve.'" Id. (quoting Labrum v. Utah State Board of Pardons, 870 P.2d 
902, 907 (Utah 1993) (citations omitted). Additionally, "not every circumstance that 
gives rise to extraordinary relief compels the immediate release of a petitioner from every 
aspect of physical imprisonment." Id. (citing Wickham v. Fisher, 629 P.2d 896, 900 
(Utah 1981) (holding that remedy for unlawful condition of confinement is elimination of 
that specific condition of physical imprisonment, not release from every aspect of 
physical imprisonment) (citations omitted). Petitioner requested a rehearing to consider 
the new presentence report and his claims that the Board improperly adjusted his 
California sentences. The Board conducted a Special Attention Review and decided not 
to change his April 2003 rehearing. Subsequently, on April 10, 2003, the Board 
conducted the rehearing at which time Petitioner had full opportunity to raise these issues. 
After the hearing, the Board decided to parole Petitioner on April 6, 2004. The Board 
properly used its discretion, and Petitioner received the necessary due process. 
6 
ORDERED by the Court this 
L.A 
DISTRIC 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER OF THE 
COURT, postage prepaid, on this ^/ffiiav of April 2004 to the following: 
Michael Brian Whiteman 
USP #22588 
Utah State Prison 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, UT 84020 
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